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Over the last two decades, organic farming has moved from a form of agriculture on 
the fringe of society to a situation where its products are now stocked in many 
supermarkets around the world.  This paper aims to analyse the relationship of market 
signals and agricultural policy signals on the level of organic farming, with a cross-
country analysis in two key years, 1990 and 2001.    Evidence is provided of the key 
importance of public organic agricultural extension support, organic agricultural 
research and development (R&D), the availability of marketing and sales outlets for 
organic produce and countries’ environmental regulations in positively driving the 
adoption of organic agriculture by farmers. Empirical evidence seems to indicate that 
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  1Introduction 
The strength and growth of organic agriculture in the last decade and a half has 
surprised many commentators.  It has moved from a form of agriculture on the fringe 
of society to one where its products are now stocked in many supermarkets around the 
world.  It is often argued that organic agriculture is said to be the only sector of 
agriculture that has developed under truly free market conditions (MacRae et al 
1990).  In one sense this statement is correct, especially looking back twenty years or 
so, but lately numerous policies have been designed (mainly in Europe) to positively 
influence organic agriculture’s growth.  The individual importance of such policies is 
unclear.  This paper seeks to analyse the relationship between these policies and 
market signals on countries share of organic agriculture.   
 
Certified organic agriculture is now practised in more than 110 countries worldwide. 
In 1986 there were 0.12 million hectares of organically managed land in Europe, 
rising to 1.2 million hectares in 1996.  Organic farming currently varies between 0.22 
to 26% of total agriculture in Europe, and average annual growth is forecast at 20 to 
40%. The leaders in organic agriculture are predominantly Austria, Switzerland and 
Scandinavian countries. Sweden is aiming for 20% of its agriculture to be organic by 
2012, while Austria is aiming for 30% by the same time.  Nearly 80% of the 
expansion in organic farming has taken place since the late 1990s (Willer and Yussefi 
2005 and 2006).  
 
There are many potential drivers of organic farming.  Most economic research has 
concentrated on individual farmer influences (Wynen 1988, Rigby et al 1999, 
Kasterine 2001, Burton et al 2003), and has not always considered wider country 
  2factors.  Past research has suggested the importance of market signals (Padel et al 
1999, Lohr and Salomonsson 2000) and agricultural policy signals (Padel et al 1999, 
S∅gaard 1999, Lohr and Salomonsson 2000, Michelsen and SØgaard 2001, Watson 
and Atkinson 2002, DEFRA 2002, Burton et al 2003, König 2004, de Lauwere et al 
2004) in influencing organic farming.  This paper attempts to quantify the influence of 
market and agricultural policy drivers, as well as considering other political (such as 
corruption and freedom of a country) and ecological (environmental regulation and 
conditions) influences.   
 
Methodology 
The empirical analysis uses cross-country data from 61 countries for the years 1990 
and 2001.
1  These are the same 61 countries that were used in Eliste and Fredrikkson 
(2002), who generously provided their datasets to the author.
2  Data was also obtained 
from Damania et al (2003), World Bank (2006), various Organic Agriculture 
Worldwide publications and Lampkin (2006). The regressions from 1990 and 2001 
are compared and contrasted to see if there are fundamental differences.  As at 1990, 
certified organic farming was present mainly in developed countries, while by 2001 
the picture had changed dramatically.  The differences in the measurement of some 
key variables meant that pooling the datasets was not possible, hence they are 
presented separately.  The cross-country regression for 2001 is then augmented with 
other explanatory variables not available for the 1990 model. Ordinary least square 
(OLS) and tobit analysis (which is estimated via maximum likelihood estimation) was 
used.   Table 1 defines the variables used in the models and their sources. 
                                                 
1   The difficulty in obtaining data on environmental standards and agricultural policy limited the 
years within which the analysis was conducted. 
2   Excluding Bhutan (limited organic farming information was available).  Eliste & Fredriksson 
evaluated the influences on countries agricultural environmental stringency in 1990. 
  3Table 1: Variable Definition and Data Sources 
Variable Definition  and  Source  Sign 
OAP01 & OAP90  Organic farming land share as a % of total agric. land in 1990 & 2001 
Sources: Yussefi and Willer (2002 & 2003), Willer and Yussefi (2000, 
2001 & 2005), De Castro et al (2001), Lampkin (2006), SŐL (2006), 
Häring et al (2004), Lampkin et al (1999) 
 
Agricultural Policy Signals 
STANDARDSYRS90 
STANDARDSYRS01  
Time the country had national organic standards in place 




Time the country had legal standards defining “organic” 




How many years the country had subsidies for organic farming 




Time the country had extension support for organic farming 
Source: As above 
+ 
R&D01  A dummy variable for organic agricultural research funding 
Source: As above  
+ 
Market Signals 
OECD90 & OECD01  Dummy variable for membership of OECD 





Gross domestic product per capita  
Gross domestic product per capita squared (LGDPPC = GDP logged) 




Time the country had organic product presence in supermarkets 





Index of stringency of environmental regulations for agric. sector in 1990 
Environmental sustainability index 2001 (higher levels indicate better 
environ.) 
Sources: Eliste & Fredrikkson (1999 & 2002) (datasets provided),World 
Economic Forum et al (2001) 
+ 
+ 
LEAD90 & LEAD01  Lead content allowed per gallon of gasoline 
Sources: Damania et al (2003), Lovei (1998), Thomas (1995), UNEP(2003) 
- 
FREE90 & FREE01  Two indexes from Freedom House (Political Rights and Civil Liberties) are 
added together for a measure of how free a country is, for 1990 and 2001. 






Corruption measure by International Country Risk Guide (higher levels 
indicate lower corruption) 
Source: Eliste & Fredrikkson (1999 & 2002)  
Corruption perception index for 2001 (higher levels = lower corruption) 




Share of agric. land (sum of arable and pasture land) from total land area 





Organic agricultural farms present in 1987 and 1996 
Sources: as above 
+ 
XGS90 & XGS01  Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP 
Source: World Development Indicators (2006) 
+ 
FERT90 & FERT01  Fertiliser use per hectare in grams 
Source: World Development Indicators (2006) 
- 
BSE01  Dummy variable for if a country has experienced BSE as at 2001 
Source: FSA (2001) 
+ 
 
The dependent variable used was the share of organic farming land as a percentage of 
total agricultural land (OAP90 and 01).  Such a specification was considered more 
  4indicative of the importance of organic farming in a country than alternatives such as 
the number of organic farms or the hectares of organic farming land.  
 
Table 1 illustrates the expected signs of the explanatory variables. It was hypothesised 
that the share of land under organic farming would be positively influenced by: 
•  Market signals: The time organic produce was available in supermarkets, the gross 
domestic product per capita of countries and OECD membership);  
•  Organic agricultural policy signals: the time subsidies/extension support/R&D 
expenditure/national standards/legal regulations had been available;  
•  Environmental conditions: the stringency of environmental regulations in the 
agricultural sector or the environmental sustainability index;  
•  Farming signals: the presence of a food scare such as bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy and the number of organic farmers operating; and  
•  Other policy signals: the share of goods and services as exports and the level of 
freedom in a country.  
 
Organic farming would be negatively influenced by: 
•  Farming signals: intensive environmental pressure (such as average fertiliser 
used) and extensive environmental pressure (such as share of agricultural land 
from total land area);  
•  Policy signals: the level of corruption in the country; and  




                                                 
3   This paper follows the methodology of Damania et al (2003) in using lead allowed in gasoline 
as a proxy for the stringency of environmental regulations in a country. 
  5Empirical Results 
Five specifications of the 1990 model are provided in Table 2.   
 
Table 2: Results for Share of Organic Farming as a Percentage of Total 
Agricultural Land in 1990 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Variable  OLS OLS OLS  Tobit
b OLS 










GDPPC90 -0.00   
(-0.33) 
- - - 
- 
GDPPC902 0.00   
(1.52) 
- - - 
- 






STRING 0.00   
(1.89)* 
- - - 
- 










































































































Obs  61   61   61  61  28 
Adj. R-squared  0.79   0.74   0.69   0.85  0.62  
Durbin-Watson stat  2.00   1.84   1.61     2.56  
    F-statistic  15.74   14.18   35.14     4.36  
    Prob (F-stat)  0.00   0.00   0.00     0.00  
Log  Likelihood      12.75   
Notes:  a  Models 2 to 5 use White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance
  b  Models 1-3 and 5 present t-statistics in brackets, Model 4 has z statistics 
  ***  Significant at 1% level 
  **  Significant at 5% level. 
  *  Significant at 10% level 
  6Diagnostics of the original specification (Model 1 in Table 2) indicated some 
problems.  Model 2 represents the preferred specification, with no presence of 
multicollinearity and using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance.
4  Model 3 is the restricted version of model 2 (using the methodology 
suggested by Hendry 1980), model 4 represents tobit regression and model 5 is OLS 
on a subset of the database, using only countries that had non-zero share of organic 
farming.   The fits of the 1990 models are reasonable, with the adjusted R
2 ranging 
from 0.62 to 0.85.    
 
Five specifications of the 2001 model are presented in Table 3. Model 1 represents the 
original OLS specification, model 2 the OLS specification with no problems,
5 model 
3 represents model 2’s specification with additional explanatory variables, model 4 is 
the restricted version and model 5 is tobit regression. The fits of the 2001 models are 
again reasonable, with the adjusted R
2 ranging from 0.62 to 0.68.    
 
Analysis of the results indicates some quite different drivers of the share of organic 





                                                 
4   Zero-order correlations and the condition index indicated problems with multicollinearity in 
Model 1. Problems were with GDPPC, GDPPC2, STRING and FREE.  It was resolved by 
logging GDPPC, substituting LEAD90 for STRING and dropping FREE.  Endogeneity was 
tested for using a version of the Hausman test that was proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1993), with all possible endogenous variables tested for and no presence of endogeneity 
found.  Heteroscedasticity was found and corrected for, and no autocorrelation was found. 
5   Again, severe multicollinearity was found in Model 1. Problems were with GDPPC, GDPPC2, 
ESI01, CORR and FREE.  Problems resolved with combinging GDPPC, ESI01 and CPI01 
into one variable, and dropping FREE.  No presence of endogeneity or autocorrelation found, 
but heteroscedasticity was found and corrected for. 
  7Table 3: Results for Share of Organic Farming as a Percentage of Total 
Agricultural Land in 2001 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS  Tobit
b










GDPPC01 -0.00   
(-1.80)* 
- - - - 
GDPPC012 0.00   
(1.64) 
- - - - 
ESI01 0.07   
(1.95)* 
- -  0.03   
(-1.60) 
- 
























































FREE01 -0.08   
(-0.87) 
- - - - 
CPI01 0.06   
(0.28) 
- - - - 












































       
Obs  61 61 61 61    61 
Adjusted R-squared  0.64  0.62  0.66  0.67   0.68 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.49  2.63  2.56  2.58   -98.8 
    F-statistic  8.07  9.90  10.13  32.55    
    Prob(F-statistic)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    
Notes:  a  Models 2 to 5 use White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance 
  b  Models 1-4 present t-statistics in brackets, Model 5 has z statistics    
  ***  Significant at 1% level 
  **  Significant at 5% level. 
  *  Significant at 10% level. 
 
Market Signals 
  8The strongest market signal influencing the share of organic farming was the length of 
time supermarkets had been selling organic produce, which was highly significant in 
all specifications of 1990 and marginally significant in 2001. 
 
Surprisingly, income was often not significant in the 1990 models; however the tobit 
model found logged GDPPC to be a positive and significant influence.  Membership 
of OECD was not significant in 1990 and marginally significant (yet negative) in 
2001. Income was also significant and negative in 2001, however the severe 
multicollinearity problems meant that it had to be combined with corruption and 
environmental sustainability indexes.  
 
How can such a scenario of income playing a very different role in the two databases 
make sense?  It is important to realise the fundamental changes that have occurred in 
the world of organic agriculture over that time period.  Our dependent variable is 
production based, not consumption based. If information had been available for 
consumption of organic produce by country then it is highly likely that income would 
be playing a strong positive role in both years.  Although the consumption of organic 
produce is likely to be correlated with the share of organic farming in a country, it is 
not necessarily the same thing.  During the 1990s, many non-OECD countries started 
producing certified organic agriculture with the aim of exporting organic produce to 
developed countries. Therefore, local income per capita was not influential in 
influencing many countries supply of organic farming.  
 
The level of corruption was significant and negatively related to the share of organic 
farming in 1990 (indicating that the higher the level of corruption the less the share of 
  9organic farming). Such an influence may illustrate that consumers in more corrupt 
countries were less willing to believe they were receiving organic produce, hence less 
likely to pay premiums for organic produce and less likely to ‘pull’ organic produce 
supply.  It may also illustrate that farmers in corrupt countries are less willing to pay 
for organic certification as they may believe other farmers could cheat the system.  
The influence of corruption disappeared in the 2001 database, though combining 
corruption, income and environmental sustainability together indicated that countries 
that were wealthy, less corrupt and had high environmental sustainability had a higher 
level of influence on organic farming.  The influence of corruption as a variable may 
have disappeared in 2001 because of how the worldwide organic regulation market 
had changed.  European private regulators of organic farming expanded their fields of 
operation to developing countries (for example, one organic regulator in Switzerland 
(IMO) currently has 12 offices, 13 contacts, and 2 partners in various countries across 
the world), hence consumers buying local organic produce in 2001 (or organic 
farmers paying certification levies) were more likely to believe the regulator is 
coming from a country with a strong regard for strict standards. This may help to 
explain why the influence of a local country’s corruption level disappears.  
 
Agricultural Policy Signals 
The policy variable that was consistently significant and positive, and had one of the 
largest influences on the share of organic farming in 1990, was the length of time 
advice by publicly funded extension personnel had been available on organic farming.  
At the same time, the number of organic farmers’ three years previously was 
surprisingly not significant in influencing the share of organic farming in 1990.  This 
may indicate the importance extension officers play in providing agricultural advice 
  10in countries where an innovation such as organic farming is still in its infancy stage. 
By 2001, extension support was no longer significant, though the numbers of organic 
farmers five years earlier is now highly significant and positive.  It is possible that 
both these results may reflect a threshold effect, with the number of farmers in 1987 
below it and the number of farmers by 1996 above the threshold.
6  Reaching a certain 
threshold level of organic farmers in a country may allow informational externalities, 
economies of scale and other externalities to be achieved, promoting greater adoption 
of organic farming.  It may be possible that once this threshold is reached, other 
organic farmers are more easily able to substitute for public extension information 
sources, hence the insignificance of the extension variable, though the second-best 
nature of this variable does not allow for any certainty in this conclusion.   
 
The expanded 2001 regression model includes a variable that outweighs all other 
variables in size and significance, namely a dummy variable on R&D presence in 
organic agriculture that had a large positive influence on the share of organic farming.  
Countries that conduct research on organic agriculture actively are much more likely 
to have a higher share of organic farming, and this is the largest influence.  
 
The other policy variable that was significant in positively influencing the share of 
organic farming in 1990 was the length of time legal protection over the term 
‘organic’ had been available, though it was not significant in 2001.  
 
The length of time subsidies had been available for organic farming was not 
significant in any specification in 1990, although it was significant in the restricted 
                                                 
6   Threshold levels are often discussed in the innovation literature (Rogers 2003). 
  11regression in 2001 (model 4 in Table 3).    The general insignificance of the organic 
subsidy variables may arise for different reasons.  First of all, the second-best nature 
of our variables may not reflect true differences between countries, hence clouding 
the overall results.  However, bearing in mind the weaknesses with the data, in the late 
1980s subsidies were small and it is unlikely that they would have played a major role 
in influencing farmers to adopt organic agriculture.  The greening of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 1990s increased the subsidies available to convert to 
organic farming, hence increasing the importance of subsidies in farmers’ decisions to 
adopt organic farming.  Finally, the non-significant subsidy variable result in 1990 
and the significant subsidy result in 2001 may reflect a common argument in the 
literature: those farmers who are currently adopting organic agriculture are primarily 
doing it for financial reasons, not environmental or health reasons which drove 
original adopters of organics (Wynen 1988, Guthman 2000, Rigby and Caceres 2001).  
It is reassuring that the cross-country analysis produces similar results to other 
sociological and individual innovation adoption research.  
 
The time that national standards of organic farming had been present was not 
significant in any specification. There is some evidence that the presence of legal 
regulations may positively influence the level of organic farming, though it is limited.    
 
Ecological and Farming Signals 
Environmental regulations (STRING) were positively and significantly related to 
organic farming in 1990.  Given STRING’s correlation with other key variables, the 
measure of lead allowed in gasoline (LEAD90) was substituted instead in 1990.  
LEAD90 was significant in negatively influencing the share of organic farming in 
  121990.   In 2001, the interaction effect of corruption, an index of environmental 
sustainability and income (CPI01, ESI01 and LGDPPC01) was positively related to 
the share of organic farming, indicating that countries with high income, low 
corruption and high environmental sustainability had a positive influence on organic 
farming. From these general results, and looking back at the general insignificance of 
income in 1990, it seems that environmental regulations and conditions in countries 
are an important positive influence on the level of organic farming, and they are more 
important in influencing a country’s share of organic farming than the income per 
capita of the country. 
 
The indicator of intensive environmental pressure (FERT) generally had a negative 
significant influence on organic farming in 1990, though it was not significant in 
2001.  The indicator of extensive environmental pressure (ARABLELAND) also had 
a negative significant influence on organic farming in 1990 but was not significant in 
2001.  Such a result may support the environmental conditions and regulations.  The 
indicator of whether a major food scandal had occurred by 2001 (BSE01) and the 




Although the final models presented in the two cross-country databases were free of 
data problems, other issues remain.  Overall, the fit of the models can only be 
described as reasonable at best.  The 1990 database performed better than the 2001 
database. The lack of significance in both models was expected given the second-best 
nature of key variables (especially organic farming policy variables), data difficulties 
  13and the relatively small sample sizes.  Nevertheless, there are some interesting 
conclusions that can be drawn from the econometrics.  Firstly, the results from the 
1990 regressions and the 2001 regressions are similar in some respects, but 
fundamentally different in other respects.  It is important to remember that organic 
farming went from a ‘fringe’ activity in 1990, practiced only by some developed 
countries (traditional agriculture not withstanding), to a much more widespread 
activity in 2001.  The average share of organic farming increased over 15 fold from 
1990 to 2001, with the most contributors being non-OECD countries.  
 
Both market and agricultural policy signals played very important roles in influencing 
the level of organic farming, though agricultural policy signals seem to be more 
important.  The availability (and promotion) of organic produce in supermarkets 
positively influences the share of organic farming in countries.  It is likely that 
supermarkets act by both increasing consumer demand through availability and 
convenience, by providing contracts and decreased risk to organic farmers to grow 
and supply organic produce. Agricultural policy signals that seem the most important 
include the availability of extension support and the presence of organic agricultural 
R&D funding. Other evidence on the relationship between ecological and farming 
signals seems mixed, with the most consistent results being countries’ environmental 
regulations and conditions do positively drive the level of organic farming. 
 
The level of organic farming in a country is therefore influenced by both demand and 
supply factors, though empirical evidence emphasises the supply side driven influence 
more. 
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